The sound of the perpetrator – thoughts on trauma and voice in Big Little Lies by Rogers, Juliet
Law Text Culture 
Volume 24 Article 18 
2020 
The sound of the perpetrator – thoughts on trauma and voice in Big Little 
Lies 
Juliet Rogers 
University of Melbourne, juliet.rogers@unimelb.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc 
Recommended Citation 
Rogers, Juliet, The sound of the perpetrator – thoughts on trauma and voice in Big Little Lies, 
Law Text Culture, 24, 2020, 455-479. 
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol24/iss1/18 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
The sound of the perpetrator – thoughts on trauma and voice in Big Little Lies 
Abstract 
Sound is as much part of the atmospheres of justice as is touch or image or even smell. Sound gets into 
the body and it leaves a mark. Sometimes that mark can be called violence, sometimes harm, and 
sometimes a crime. In this article I discuss how sound, as voice as well as the other nebulous sonic 
elements, such as grunts, shuffles and sighs, can leave a mark that can be called trauma. Using 
psychoanalysis I discuss theories of trauma as they intersect with experiences of sound in the courtroom 
as well as in fictional narratives. I examine the mark of trauma, as an experience of rape, as it appeared in 
the series Big Little Lies and I discuss how it can appear in the courtroom using psychoanalysis and the 
work of thinkers on sexual assault, on voice and on sound. I conclude that sound cannot not be part of 
the thinking on justice for victim-survivors of sexual assault, as well as of other interpersonal crimes. 
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol24/iss1/18 
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When sound enters the body it is never without impact. We might call 
this impact damage, harm, resonance, recognition or perhaps listening. 
These are all of the same family here. Sound provokes the body’s 
response. The body contorts around the sound. Sonic fragments are 
arranged, ordered, made sense of. Some let in, others guarded against. 
Sound is felt physiologically and psychologically. That is, it is felt in 
the flesh. Where the particles of sound enter the body and cannot be 
placed, where they cannot allow the flesh to wrap around, to order, to 
arrange or assimilate the meaning of the sound – either as symbol or as 
sensation – then there is trauma. 
As James Parker (2018) has illustrated in his discussion of the 
Long-Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), sound can be a weapon that 
traumatises the flesh. It can do damage at the level of physiognomy 
in a form that can be called harm. The destruction of hearing, the 
destruction of life, can be the result of sound. In the forms he analyses, 
the weapons are designed to impact as destruction or, not mutually 
exclusively, as control. In these forms sound as a weapon leaves a mark 
on and inside the body, sometimes a lethal one. The limits of its entry 
are not easily policed or prevented against. And this entry can disturb 
and distort us at fundamental levels. Sound permeates flesh and it can 
permeate identity; sound can change us. When it does, it permeates 
the parameters or outlines that give the body its imaginary limits; those 
456
Juliet Rogers
that are neither real nor unreal but exist as the perceptions of where we 
begin and end, of which skin is only one border. When sound permeates 
our perceived limits it can fragment identity and when that identity 
is permeated by sound at the same time that the body is damaged or 
injured by another, then the effects can be devastating. 
Here I want to discuss how sound, as voice – the not quite not 
language theorised by Mladen Dolar (2006) – and as the other nebulous 
sonic elements, such as grunts, shuffles and sighs, can leave a mark in 
and on the body; a mark that can be called trauma. To understand this 
mark I will analyse how the specificities of sound, particularly when it 
appears through or as the voice of perpetrators of interpersonal violence, 
can impact on the body of people often called victim/survivors and 
how it can produce a traumatic effect. This effect, I suggest, can be 
ameliorated, sometimes, by a space for testimony in the juridical world, 
but not always. And that space must be specific and enable the story 
to be transmitted, in the terms of psychoanalyst Dori Laub (1992: 69). 
Transmission, as I will explain, is no simple exchange, but involves the 
legal conditions of receipt as well as the sonic space for hearing. Again, 
no simple thing, but a crucial focus if we are to think about justice in 
more than its presence as words and images, that is, if we are to think 
about justice in all its dimensions.
To elaborate these layered concerns with sound and voice I discuss 
a few sonic moments, scenes or events (it is hard to categorise these 
when sound leaks across temporality) in the celebrated series Big 
Little Lies, in which people we can call victims and perpetrators speak 
and do not. Through analysing these moments, with the assistance of 
psychoanalytic work on trauma and identity, I want to consider how the 
sound of the perpetrator of interpersonal violence might be understood 
not quite as a weapon but as a vehicle of trauma within the political 
and legal structures which enable trauma to be experienced as such. 
I am not convinced of this effect, nor do I believe it can be applied 
universally, instead I will compose a conversational note on trauma, 
sound and legal identity in the hope that it adds to the thinking in 
the relatively new field of law and sound being largely illuminated by 
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Nasser Hussein (2013), Sara Ramshaw (2013) and James Parker (2015).
My expertise is not in the area of sound, but in the area of trauma. In 
my previous role as a trauma therapist, however, I heard a lot – perhaps 
too much – on how sound was used in interpersonal violence, and, if 
we are to consider justice, in one light, as the practice of a response 
to trauma and violence, then we cannot not think on the possible 
violences of sound and voice. Just as we cannot not encounter law in 
all geographical spaces, as Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has 
remarked (2018: 4). I would suggest, in parallel agreement with Parker, 
that we cannot not encounter law in all sonic spaces (2015: 205).  
In part one I explore a scene from Big Little Lies, what I am 
calling a scene of recognition of the perpetrator of rape for one of the 
characters. This scene is populated, as I discuss, with images, language 
and/as sound. The voice of the perpetrator, its rhythms as much as 
the grammar used, return the memory of the assailant back to the 
victim/survivor. I then discuss how the body’s permeation by sound 
can be felt traumatically precisely because of the attachment of that 
body to an identity that cannot or will not be permeated. Sound, as 
I discuss, functions alongside the rape, as a kind of metaphor, but it 
relies on particular attachments to the limits of the body as an outline 
of identity, a legal identity, populated by its fantasies of autonomy and 
agency. This outline, as I consider in part two, is defended against to 
more or less degrees. Sound, like language, and the recognition of 
the presence of others as such, must get in. Sound, in psychoanalysis, 
permeates identity insofar as its very existence demands recognition 
of the otherness of others. As such, sound, as I discuss in part three, is 
a metonym for trauma itself, insofar as it is always a rupture. In part 
four I discuss how this rupture can be exacerbated in the courtroom, 
and how law can influence the experience of such a rupture. Law, I 
suggest, can speak to sound, and in so doing, potentially put sound in 
its place, putting the perpetrator back in the place of legally subject 




Part I – the sound of recognition
In the first series of Big Little Lies viewers come to understand that the 
character, Jane, has been raped and violently assaulted. The knowledge 
of this assault is unfolded slowly in the series. The audience and her 
friends discover, through scenic overlays of Jane’s memories, that 
the rape was brutal, that the effects are enduring: hypervigilance, 
nightmares, flashbacks, as well as the conception of her son, Ziggy. We 
learn that the perpetrator was not known to her, but for a conversation 
in a bar before the assault; that she cannot recall his name, his face or 
his voice, until (spoiler alert) the end of the series in which she realises 
he is the husband of one of her friends. This recognition is played out in 
the final moments of the last episode of Season One, when she stands 
in the group of her friends, while Jane’s friend Celeste is being harassed 
by her husband: Perry. Jane looks at Perry while he is demanding of 
Celeste that she leave the function with him. After a few moments 
Jane realises that Perry is the man who raped her years earlier. 
This is the classic cinematic scene of recognition. It unfolds in 
a well-rehearsed portrayal of traumatic memory. Images flash. The 
side of his face before her, interspersed with the memory of his face 
as he left the room and closed the door after raping her. The scene of 
recognition and realisation is, on first glance, populated by images. 
But this realisation is marred in sound as well as silence, as we will 
see/hear/read. This scene opens when Perry is confronting Celeste at 
a school function after he has discovered she is leaving him. 
Perry: Celeste can I talk to you for a minute?
Celeste: No
Perry: Please Celeste can I talk to you?
Celeste: No [shakes her head]
Perry: Let’s go back to the car.
Celeste: I’m not coming back with you.
Perry: Celeste?
Celeste: No
Renata [one of the friends]: I think she just needs a minute.
Perry: I appreciate your concern but I’m talking to my wife not you. 
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Celeste, let’s just go now. We have to talk about it.
Celeste: [shouts] NO!  I’m not coming home with you, so just don’t do this 
in front of everyone do you understand. I’m not….
And the voice fades while Jane slides into what is commonly referred 
to in trauma literature as a ‘flashback’1 of the man leaving the room 
after raping her; then running on the beach, which is repopulated by a 
revenge fantasy that has been emerging in particles across the episodes. 
Running, trying to catch up to the faceless man (or catch up to the 
memory). For the first time, in this scene she reaches him. Finally. He 
turns. She sees his face and it is Perry, Celeste’s violent husband. In 
this repopulated memory Jane points a gun. This pointing, with the 
additional sound of a gunshot, is then re-produced or re-fantasised in 
the immediate moment while she is with the group of women at the 
function. It is layered and complex, in images and in sound. Bear with 
me.
Immediately, we might read this scene as the portrayal of a visual 
memory. Jane sees Perry’s face while he’s addressing Celeste, just on an 
angle, and she remembers him leaving the room where he raped her. It 
is as if the memory of the face provokes the remembering. And perhaps 
this is partially true. But, the scene progresses, Perry’s voice persists, in 
spite of Celeste’s repeated ‘No’. This is the refusal; the limit not heard 
and respected. It is also a sonic event and a sonic metaphor for the rape; 
one played out in sound and silence. And we can understand the above 
exchange as one layer of a scene populated by images, language, voice 
and background music. But it is more than its linguistic, vocal or even 
musical presence. It is also punctuated by the rhythms of sound; of the 
silence between the voice and between the address and response. I’ll 
unpack these elements in what follows. 
The exchange between Celeste and Perry is framed in terms of his 
demand and her refusal, followed by his demand which ignores the ‘No’ 
and continues, almost without registering her refusal. His persistent 
overriding of her wishes is, most obviously, a metaphor for sexual 
assault. But not only. It is also, as I will explain, a metaphor for an 
enforced fragmentation of identity; these fragments being metonymized 
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in the in-between silences. These are the silences in which the response 
of Celeste is not heard but forms only a pivot to the next relation-less 
demand perpetrated as the refusal to recognise the simple presence of 
another; the refusal to hear the ‘no’ and walk away.
Examining the exchange above, applying Alison Young’s insights on 
the language used in rape trials, we can understand that the exchange 
as not only the performance of language, but a relation to sound as well 
as to silence. In Young’s analysis of one woman being cross-examined 
by the defence: 
Her negative reply never halts the defence narrative; the questioner 
never concedes that any element of the counter-narrative has been 
displaced. Questions follow on as if the victim had agreed with the 
questioner, as if her “no” was a ‘yes’ (1998: 463).
The effect of this is an obvious annihilation of agency in the gaze 
of the jury. It is what we might think of as the classically misogynist 
re-symbolisation of women’s desire represented as confused: ‘No 
means yes’. Woman is represented in this exchange as not to be trusted 
in knowing her own desire and certainly not to be trusted in her 
duplicitous representation of it to a man. This is where notions of what 
has come to be called ‘re-traumatisation’ in trials can be readily applied; 
where the woman’s narrative – that any lack of active consent means 
‘no’ - is not only negated but emptied of any status as authoritative or 
indeed as valid (Orth et al 2004, Rogers 2010).2 But the effect is also 
an insertion of voice into the body.
On the one hand the woman in Young’s account hears the words, 
but, like the character, Celeste, these words are not halted by her 
refusal of the narrative. There is no effect of the refusal. The demands 
continue, the questions persist without acknowledging the response. 
Just as Jane has initially resisted Perry’s assault, only surrendering 
when, as she describes, ‘[she] thought he was going to kill [her]’, the 
questions from the defence, are, in Young’s idiom, a metonym for the 
assault. The woman’s body is rendered permeable by the persistence of 
the questions, unchecked and unaltered by her refusal.
The only indication that a woman’s ‘no’ had an impact in Big Little 
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Lies - and commonly in systemic violence toward women by partners 
and ex-partners (Alaattinoğlu et al 2018) – is the rage of the husband 
at his own inability to have an impact with his words. He then applies 
other parts of his physiognomy in the well-worn and well-documented 
modality of violent husbands (ibid). He rushes toward her, landing 
blows, knocking her to the ground, then repeatedly kicking her while 
she is cowering. Celeste’s body, we see later when she is speaking to 
police, is torn, bloody and bruised from his efforts. Impact achieved. 
Body permeated.
In the exchange above Perry’s ignoring of Celeste’s ‘No’ is not only 
indicated by his refusal not to engage with or adhere to her wishes, it is 
present in the silences which punctuate the time since she speaks and the 
time before he does. In these silences there is an extra-subjective space 
in which the delay indicates a shift in grammatical relation. Her ‘no’ is 
a direct and relational engagement with his request – the fact that he 
does not like it is irrelevant. His repeated demands, without registering 
the ‘no’, are precisely an erasure of a response at all. In exercising this 
erasure silence is rendered the dominant response, and an element in 
the violent rhythms of the assault that Jane remembers. Evident in the 
first few sentences of the exchange:
Perry: Celeste can I talk to you for a minute? 
Celeste: No 
Perry: Please Celeste can I talk to you? 
Celeste: No...
The demand – to say it is a question would be disingenuous – and the 
response: ‘No’, operate between the effective silence as silencing. That 
is, the repetition of the demand appears as if the ‘No’ was a silence. And 
then, of course, there is the silence that exists between the repetition, 
producing the exchange as a rhythmic beat.
Repetition in this exchange operates like a melody, and not a sweet 
one. As Laub notes in the context of the speech of victim/survivors 
testifying to their experiences. ‘It seems to me that in addition to what 
is manifestly said, associated to, dreamt about and elaborated, there is 
another, a more subtle melody’ (1992: 63). It is this melody, the staccato 
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rhythm of Perry’s repetitive demands that Jane hears, or rather it is the 
space between the sound (between the notes) that she populates with 
recognition. It is not simply the voice that she hears which reminds 
her of the assailant, but the rhythm; one which resembles the body 
blows of Perry’s assault, and the irrelevance of her own refusal in the 
experience of being raped.  
Perry’s speech pattern here is certainly a metaphor for the rape itself, 
but his sonic rhythms enhance this effect. Shown briefly in several of 
Jane’s flashbacks where she describes him as being like a ‘machine’, 
and we are shown the brutal rhythm of his assault on her. Repetitive, 
mechanical, furious. The repetition is thus melody as metaphor played-
out on her body at the time and replayed in her flesh – through the 
experience of hearing – at the moment of recognition. In this sense it is 
the sound of Perry’s voice, his silence and his non-relational demands, as 
much as it might be the visual recognition of his face, which provokes 
her memory.
Part II – skin, rights and identity.
The impact of Perry’s blows on Celeste’s body after her ‘No’ has failed 
is doubled in its representation in the show when she is later shown 
speaking to the police, and, although we see that she is bloody and 
bruised, the exchange is muted. The other women from this group are 
also then shown in similar interviews with police, also muted. Music, 
as part of the celebrated soundtrack of this series, is played over them. 
Their mouths move, their hands gesture, their eyes engage, flicker and 
close, their bodies flinch as they recount a version of what occurred. 
But we don’t hear their voices for some time. One could read this as an 
astute representation of the muting of women’s narratives in both sexual 
assault and domestic violence, the two dominant narrative threads of 
this series. However, I want to focus here on these moving mouths and 
the object called voice which falls from the mouth, understanding the 
mouth as a cut in the body in Lacanian terms. 
The mouth, for Jacques Lacan, is a cut from which an intangible, 
unrepresentable object falls: voice (2006: 693). Whereas the ear is the 
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inverted cut which sound falls into. And the body is then the bricolage 
of what Jacques-Alain Miller (2004) refers to as ‘spare parts’, skin and 
rights being the limits, which hold the image of the body – both felt 
and fantasised – together as identity. Let us begin with the mouth. As 
Young has illuminated:
Much has been written about the mouth as a projectile device.3 It is 
from the mouth that insults can issue, it is from the mouth that hate 
speech is uttered, it is from the mouth that accusations of rape can 
be made. Our fascination with the speaking mouth derives from its 
constitution as a border between the inner self and the outer other. The 
mouth opens, the tongue moves, the voice sounds, words are uttered. 
Ingestion operates in reverse: the mouth opens, a thing is inserted, 
the tongue moves, the throat closes. The outer other is incorporated 
into the interior self (1998: 454).
The mouth here is articulated as a ‘border’, but one that is only 
policed by its closure, and only effective if this closure is not breached. 
The border denotes a level of autonomy, - we could call it sovereignty, 
when permission for entry or exit is the purview, entirely, of the subject 
- over that which exists within its boundaries: the body.4 The body, is, 
however, not without its imaginary limits; limits which entwine legal 
subjectivity, social and political representations of a body’s teleology as 
well as – and never mutually exclusively - physiological perceptions of 
where flesh begins and ends. Beginnings and endings which engage, 
adjust or disintegrate when their limits are permeated. This is as true of 
the mouth, and ingestion, as it is of the ear and hearing. To understand 
the mouth’s role in speech, as well as to understand the ear’s role in 
sonic-relations, we need to elaborate politico-legal perceptions of an 
identification with the body’s imaginary limits and their relation to skin.
Permeation of the politico-legal outline of a woman’s body in 
particular are helpfully articulated in Jacqueline Rose’s (2016) account 
of a male colleague repeatedly ignoring her refusal of more wine at a 
collegial dinner. Filling her glass, despite her ‘no’ – even when she 
placed her hand over the top of the glass – he pours the wine over her 
hand. It trickles into the glass from between her closed fingers. This 
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is not a scene of sexual assault, but, as a metaphor for such an act it is 
not not such a scene. The experience being, in every sense, subjective. 
What we can say is that it is certainly invasive, if not violent; it is, 
simply, ignorant of the presence of another. These are the phrases and 
words we use for this kind of act. And, in experiences like Rose’s, the 
wine – like sound, as Parker has noted – changes the feel of her skin, of 
her hand, and perhaps it changes her belief in her capacity to authorise 
a ‘no’.  Rose’s actions, we can say, are at least partially choreographed 
around this man’s behaviours. Her relationship to her own authority, to 
others, and perhaps to wine is compromised, and maybe altered in the 
future. This is both the affective relations that law cannot comprehend, 
in Peter Goodrich’s (1998) terms, but it is also damage, at one level, 
because, if we are to believe Lacan, trauma is always a trauma to identity. 
Identity is the belief, in Lacan’s terms, in the ‘I, I take myself to 
be’, and that ‘I’ is intimately attached to the legal constitution and the 
contours of its body; an I who can decide, who can refuse, and who can 
influence the behaviour of another. An autonomous I. An I who can 
act in the capacity of, what psychoanalyst Jamieson Webster describes 
as the ‘lionized individual’(2019: 7). Lionised by parents as much as 
by law and the political emphases of the western world and through, 
as Gayatri Spivak astutely notes the ‘isolationist admiration’ of the 
western individual that promises isolation as agency and, indeed, as 
the freedom to exercise privacy and freedom from the state (1999: 114). 
The contours of such an individual reside in the symbols with which 
one constitutes or cloaks oneself. In this sense, skin and rights bear the 
same insignia, not only as the parameters of what we’ve come to call 
privacy, but as the outline of an identity that is substantiated through 
its capacity to exercise desire, and indeed refusal. Speech – the ‘no’ in 
this case – is an articulation of an identification as such an individual, but 
hearing is the involuntary compromise of such parameters, and sound 
is the vehicle which lacerates the integrity of its contours.
Identity, in its symbolic and substantive contours, is tied intrinsically 
to not only law’s production of the outline of the legal subject, but 
to the image of oneself as a lived body, as flesh. The body that feels, 
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speaks, hears and refuses. Identity, in psychoanalysis, is linked to the 
imaginary limits of the body, insofar as the body can repel, guard 
against or permit the invasions – weather or touch – from the external 
world. In the sense of touch, including the touch of the state, identity is 
linked to the perceived limits of transgression by others, including the 
state.5 Both these registers of identity are not fixed and need to wrangle 
with the question of their permeability. How much can a person or an 
element enter the body, including how much sound?
Sound, when it appears as voice, demands the industry of ordering 
and promotes what we call desire, as the desire to make the sound 
representable. This is in part because voice falls from the mouth as an 
object which cannot be represented. It is, as Lacan says, ‘non-specular’. 
Like the gaze that falls from the eyes,6 voice falls from the mouth.  But 
the mouth is also a cut in the body, which gives voice a dual significance. 
Voice, as it falls from the mouth of others, offers the promise of 
returning the body to itself as whole, to heal the cut, as it were. This is 
a discussion of the dynamic of castration (the cut) in psychoanalysis, 
but we need not dwell on the technicalities of psychoanalysis, suffice to 
say that the knowledge of the cut – as a severance of something from 
the whole body – heralds the entrance of the subject into a world with 
others, into the world of language, the symbolic world. This entrance 
into the symbolic world is when sounds come to be framed into sense, 
as opposed to nonsense. Although the non-sense quality will always 
endure as a mark of that which cannot be understood, comprehended 
or mastered.7 In Lacan’s terms language ‘holds out …the tired allure 
of the shadow as if it were substance’, as if the shadow of a sound, as 
speech of gesture, or of a meaning, the alternative interpretations of a 
sound, can all be known at once (2006: 693). In short, as if there were 
no question of our understandings of ourselves and of others. 
But sound is not a substance, and as such it heralds unknowability, 
and at the same time the recognition, at some level, that there is always 
a shadow to representation; a world outside the mastery of the self. That 
is, voice, in its shadowy form, is a metonym for the unknowable parts of 
the other person and, indeed, of the unknowable parts of the symbolic 
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world. As such, voice exists always with the potential to indicate the 
subject as being barred from anything like what we might call full 
comprehension of others and of oneself, and this lack of comprehension is 
a parallel experience with trauma.
Part III – the trauma of sound
The understanding of voice as an object which pronounces 
unknowability, or as a metonym for incomprehension, means that 
voice, as it enters the body that hears, always undermines the belief 
that the subject has its own autonomy. This is both the best and worst 
effects of voice; it demands hearing and as such it demands encounter 
of a non-narcissistic type.8 It demands, as I’ve noted, that the body 
wrap around the phoneme and make sense. But it is also this industry 
that is the most disturbing and potentially the instigator of a traumatic 
effect for victim/survivors encountering perpetrators in the courtroom. 
The awareness of the impossibility of comprehension is, in one sense, 
a kind of original trauma. With the stakes, as Lacan describes of the 
‘Copernican revolution’ in which the realisation, that the Earth spun, 
and was not simply spun around, by the sun, is a terrifying realization 
that we are not all (Lacan, 2006: 429). As Jill Stauffer describes 
‘Self-formation is like a trauma striking against a self that would be 
autonomous’ precisely because of the existence of others as others 
(2015: 24). When our identities are further fractured by the brutality 
of being unable to control our surroundings or our bodies – such as in 
experiences of rape, but not only – then this can produce a trauma to 
the ‘I, I take myself to be’. I want to now speculate on how trauma is 
articulated and how this effect is potentially enhanced by the sound of 
the perpetrator in the courtroom, and not only the sight of him (and 
occasionally her or they).
It is the non-specular quality of voice– the presence of it as 
unrepresentable – when it is present as the voice of another (any 
other), that brings us alongside theories of trauma (Lacan 2006: 693). 
This is because the quality of the voice as non-representable, both 
promotes a certain libidinal investment (it promotes a desire to order, 
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to understand or to master) and gestures to the impossibility of mastery 
or of comprehension through analogy or association. The voice, as 
unable to be symbolized, endows it with a quality which parallels the 
experience of trauma where an experience is unassimilable.9 As Laub 
says of trauma:
The traumatic event, although real, took place outside the parameters 
of “normal” reality, such as causality, sequence, place and time.  The 
trauma is thus an event that has no beginning, no ending, no before, 
no during and no after. This absence of categories that define it lends 
it a quality of “otherness,” a salience a timelessness and a ubiquity that 
puts it outside the range of associatively linked experiences, outside 
the range of comprehension, of recounting and of mastery (1992: 69).
The event experienced as ‘outside the range of associatively linked 
experiences’ is what renders it ‘unassimilable’. The rendition of the event 
as ‘unassimilable’, in Cathy Caruth’s terms (1996:4), (or as ‘having a 
quality of otherness’ in Laub’s terms above), does not mean that it has 
not happened before. It means that the symbolic attachments to the 
experience of the event are what we can describe as unrecognisable 
and thus unassimilable into the prior world of the survivor. In the 
experience of rape, similar to that of torture – as recounted in the 
renowned work of Elaine Scarry (1985) – objects, including one’s own 
body, are re-signified by the perpetrator (by the ‘regime’, in Scarry’s 
terms); a smile becomes an invitation, a kiss is permission into the rest 
of the body, and the body itself – in any form of response that does not 
articulate with the ‘I, I take myself to be’ – is its own weapon against 
the victim/survivor. 
Hearing is one response which bears this potential also. Hearing 
can be an exquisite experience, such as the hearing of music, of the 
wind, the rain on a roof, of the breath of a lover. But hearing, as it 
provokes memory, including memories of pain, loss or violence, can 
turn one’s own body into a weapon against itself. In one of the many 
notable examples of this in the celebrated and much awarded series 
of West Wing the character Josh, having been shot and left for some 
time bleeding on a footpath while ambulances arrived, later attends a 
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concert and hears Yo-Yo Ma playing Bach. He recounts the experience 
to his therapist.
Josh: It was the Bach. G Major. 
Therapist: It’s a nice piece 
Josh: It is. 
Therapist: Did he play it well?  
Josh: It was Yo-Yo Ma!
But Josh’s body turns the sounds of Yo-Yo Ma’s cello performance 
of Bach into the memory of ambulance sirens, and he relives the trauma 
of being shot, or specifically of being left bleeding on the sidewalk 
hearing the sirens in the distance, perhaps arriving in time, perhaps 
not; ‘an event that has no beginning, no ending, no before, no during 
and no after’ (Laub 1992: 69). The sound – the beautiful sounds of a 
cello suite – turned into pain, terror, and an experience of near-death. 
Involuntarily. Sounds which resonate with prior experiences, sometimes 
in unpredictable ways – where the sound of a cello becomes a siren. 
And sometimes in predictable ways, when the perpetrator’s voice in 
the courtroom, resembles the voice heard at the time of the assault – 
can contort the subject in this way and when it is the hearing of the 
voice or sounds of a perpetrator, I suggest, that this can compound an 
experience of trauma.  
The experience of Perry’s voice and his silence in the exchange 
with Celeste, can be understood to function in this way for Jane. To 
understand this function it is important to understand trauma not as 
an event, but as a response to an event. That is, an event which may 
be traumatic, in Laub’s terms, is one that produces the symptoms of 
trauma as a result of an unassimilable experience. These symptoms are 
usually categorised as hypervigilance, flashbacks, nightmares, a focus 
on the past, heightened emotional responses to stimuli.10  Jane, in the 
series, expresses all these. And, in the moment that she hears Perry 
making demands of Celeste, and ignoring her refusal, these symptoms 
are heightened, as I discussed above. What I want to explain here is 
that, understood through trauma theory, this response can be enhanced 
when there is a legally permitted presence of the sound, as much as to 
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the presence of the exchange, the rhythm – as I noted above – and the 
language used.
Recalling Young’s careful analysis of cross examination – the 
production of a ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘yes’ from the mouth of the victim – we can 
understand that language in its appearance as a speech act – does its own 
damage. The speech in the courtroom when it is presented by legal 
officials, speaks an authority that can readily delegitimate the reality of 
the victim. It is in this sense that such experiences of cross examination 
– as noted by Young – can retraumatise the victim/survivor, returning 
her to the world of ‘otherness’ that was her experience of her own body, 
her own sense of herself, during the assault. But voice, as it acts beyond 
language, has another force. It can be experienced like a weapon, 
precisely because it undermines the promise of complete signification, 
or what I have explained as comprehension of the self; a confident belief in 
the ‘I, I take myself to be’. I want to suggest that something of the sonic 
presence of the perpetrator is potentially traumatic as a/the rupture to 
the identity of the victim because its presence, in sound (irrespective 
of language) inserts itself, unchecked, into the body of the victim, like 
a siren, but also, because law supports this rupture anew. 
The sonic presence of the perpetrator in the courtroom can appear in 
a number of forms; when he speaks, shuffles, grunts, or even sits silently. 
As well as his visual presence, the sonic presence can be experienced 
as evocative of pain, of anger, or of loss. As Jane notes in episode four 
of Big Little Lies, when she is presented with a photographic image of 
a man (a different man) whose name resembles the false name Perry 
gave her on the night of the assault:
Jane: Yeah, I think its him. 
If I heard his voice… 
I can still remember his voice. I can also remember that disgusting 
smell.
Here Jane’s senses intertwine to produce the possibility of memory, 
and in this industry of recognition her body wraps around the sensory 
elements in an effort to achieve comprehension. This industry is as 
much conscious as it is involuntary. The sound, like the smell, gets in. 
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The body may repel these visceral reminders out of disgust or despair, 
but they permeate the survivor without relief. In the courtroom, this 
is unavoidable.11 The victim/survivor can avert her eyes – perhaps close 
them or otherwise try and avoid the image of the perpetrator – but 
sound, like smell, is more difficult and largely impossible to close upon. 
Sound demands attention and for trauma survivors the industry 
of comprehension is enhanced in a desperation to heal the experience 
of the unassimilable. Dwelling here for a moment on this industry in 
psychoanalytic terms we can adapt Young’s discussion of the border 
as it applies to the ear, itself a ‘border’. It is like the mouth, but for a 
significant distinction; the border of the ear cannot be easily policed 
or closed and, short of applying the variety of technologies that have 
come to protect ears from industrial sound or enable noise cancelling 
for other modes of relaxation, the ear is rendered unguarded, open, 
permeable. That is, the ear betrays the subject’s capacity for autonomy 
over the intrusion or experience of sound because the very industry of 
comprehension is involuntary, like the pain induced by stress positions 
in torture, the body acts like its own pharmakon; promoting pain in 
the interest of trying to restore itself, but at the same time responding 
to the demands of the sound/noise/stress.
The lack of capacity for autonomy over the body’s experience of 
sound is not only centred on the ear, of course. As Parker points out, for 
people who have degrees of deafness the body still experiences sound 
as vibration, ‘Whatever damage a person may sustain to their cochlear 
nerve or organ of Corti, sound is experienced by the entire body’ (2015: 
203). Sound is not halted because one does not hear. Sound also does 
not obey the limits of skin – or of rights – and, as such, its evocative 
presence can resemble the traumatic rupture of the assault itself. The 
very incapacity to control the borders of the body can feel reminiscent 
of the invasive experience because sound is not impacted by the ‘no’. As 
such the hearing body of the victim can be forced, in the courtroom, 
into a state of recognition, not simply remembering but reliving the 
experience of the assault.
It is in this forced reliving that the experience of the voice of the 
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perpetrator can resemble the experience of the assault, enhanced by 
law’s work to recreate the event, right there, in the courtroom, for the 
purposes of judgement, if not justice. This recreation in the courtroom 
is, in an obvious sense, counter to psychoanalytic thoughts on what 
is conducive to experiences of repair or what has come to be called 
healing for victim/survivors of trauma, but not simply because of the 
hearing but because of an environment which condones this hearing. 
As Laub says:
[for healing to occur] a therapeutic process…of re-externalising the event 
– has to be set in motion.  This…can occur and take effect only when 
one can articulate and transmit the story, literally transfer it to another 
outside oneself and then take it back again, inside. Telling thus entails 
a reassertion of the hegemony of reality … (my empahsis 1992: 69)
Re-externalising the event requires a presentation, and often as a 
speech act, of the event in the present community. It is not any present 
community, however, but one in which the story can be transmitted, 
and this is a concern with the conditions for transmission, or simply put 
it is a concern with the hegemonic reality of the courtroom.
A ‘reassertion of the hegemony of reality’ for the trauma survivor 
who enters the courtroom and must hear the sounds of the perpetrator, 
requires that the law act to change the rhythms of the perpetrator’s 
sounds. On the one hand this would be to punctuate, to rupture, to 
silence the perpetrator, to show that he and sometimes she and or 
they, is subject to sonic parameters that do not allow his vocal presence 
unchecked; that he must hear the ‘no’. This is not simply a paternalizing 
of the law such that it takes on the limits of the woman’s body and 
protects (although it is not not that), it is the returning of the perpetrator 
to the realm of reality. 
Perpetrators who are experienced as being able to act with impunity 
during acts of violence, to act without regard for the physiological or 
legal limits of the body, are more than simply what we call violent or 
even criminals, they are the monsters of childhood fantasy. It is why 
survivors of extreme acts of violence, at the hands of other humans, 
experience breaks or permutations of reality, such as hallucinations. 
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This is the work of trauma when it produces a feeling of otherness, a 
realisation that an event can have, in Laub’s terms, ‘no beginning, no 
ending, no before, no during and no after’(1992:69), like a dream or 
indeed a fantasy. This is the stuff of limitless imagination where childish 
realities (Freud 1919) – of being subject to the whims of adults to the 
point of life and death – having been put in the place of fantasy in 
adulthood, then return to the realm of reality. ‘I thought he was going 
to kill me’, is to experience an event without end at the hands of an 
omnipotent perpetrator.
In the series Big Little Lies there is an end to the event. The 
perpetrator dies. But the second series is organised around the law’s 
response to the event. A question of judgment. A question of justice. 
Framed in the immortality of Perry – his mother before, his children 
after. What is left of Perry, such that he retains the omnipotence of a 
perpetrator without limits, is embodied in the law. And it becomes the 
question as the not so subtle melody of Celeste’s life, battling her own 
guilt, battling her own desires to feel pain (both inside and outside 
her body ), battling in the courts.  As one commentator describes the 
second series, it is telling a story about ‘the pervasive rot of masculinity, 
aided by our justice system’ (Guy 2019), and this is played out through 
multiple interfaces with law’s administrators, spaces and sounds.
The courtroom scene in which Celeste now must argue to retain her 
children, in the face of Perry’s mother, who is attempting to take custody 
or residency from Celeste is one such scene. It is a scene replete with the 
agency of the women played out in definitive speech acts as they battle 
each other before the law. Levelled in their resources – financial and 
emotional, it seems. The arguments are a rhythmic exchange, a dance; 
and the viewer witnesses what feels like a just result. The law understands 
its own failings, supposedly. Celeste keeps her children, the pervasive 
rot of masculinity seemingly limited by, not aided by, the justice system. 
However, this win can be juxtaposed against the deliberate muting of 
the group of friends, as they are interviewed individually by the police 
after the death of Perry.
The muting is a device through which they can be at once viewed 
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by the police on the other side of the mirrored glass. Through this 
frame a speaker hisses a kind of white noise, the women tell a story, 
with repetitive facial gestures, a story which we discover at the end of 
the show, is fictitious. In this scene they are rendered liars. The female 
detective, clicking her lighter back and forth, in a Sherlock Holmes 
type gesture, knows the truth. She like, Bonnie, the only other major 
black character, have a “special knowledge” about what is going on, 
the classic ‘magical negro’ often portrayed in films dominated by white 
characters (Glenn et al 2009). Bonnie sees Perry as suspicious when he 
is looking for Celeste, she follows him, and it is Bonnie who effectively 
kills him, pushing him down the stairs where he falls onto a spike that 
punctures his throat. Killing him. Silencing him. 
Silence is the ‘subtle melody’ in these scenes, as what Laub notes 
as present in the narratives of all survivors. Silence as perhaps what we 
place into it. The white noise, the clicking lighter enhancing the effect 
of the women’s silence, and when the scene of Perry beating Celeste is 
replayed, before he is pushed by Bonnie, there is a gentle piano melody 
Agnes Obel’s September Song – and a hint of crashing waves in the 
background that we can’t quite not hear. The police interviews become 
a kind of parody of women’s treatment before the law. Liars. Silenced. 
The series parodies their experience before the law, even where they 
are culpable. ‘Why lie?’ the male detective asks, as if telling the truth 
would result in justice. What the audience knows is precisely why they 
lie, precisely why Perry was killed. What we have seen for the series 
is the treatment of women: of Jane, of Celeste, of Madi, of Renata, 
none of whom went to the police to look for justice. Now, in this silent 
exploration of their faces we are all sympathy. Perry had to die. And 
this reasonable act, rendered want we might call “proportionate force” 
by the prior narrative – returns them as legal subjects. 
Proportionality is as natural as the crashing waves, but it is not 
always so clear, and proportionality is hard to narrate in the courtroom, 
as a long history of arguments over provocation and self-defence when 
women kill violent husbands in their sleep, reminds us (Tyson 2012). 
This, then, is the melody carried on the crashing waves and rolling piano 
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as the women are interviewed by the police, and the scene of Perry’s 
death replayed. This is the subtle melody of law that cannot be drawn 
out in the interviews, no matter the naturalness of proportionality 
evoked by the killing of a violent husband, who, we are shown and 
we are told, at least two women in the show thought would kill them. 
Perry’s death does not end the violence of law’s misunderstanding of 
women’s experience at the hands of violent men. This remains the 
omnipotent, the unjudged.
Judgement would be to submit the perpetrator to the parameters 
of reality and thus return the omnipotent perpetrator to the realm 
of fantasy, leaving only the human who is subject to the laws of this 
world. This is a reassertion of the hegemony of reality as reality. It is 
this hegemonic reality which must confirm the contours of the victim/
survivor, allowing for her to moderate and mediate her own sensory 
parameters. But in the realm of justice, such that it is, we cannot ask 
that the perpetrator not speak, not grunt, not shuffle or indeed, not 
to smell or even move the air in proximity to the sensory world of 
the victim/survivor. That is, it is not the court’s role to protect the 
victim/survivor from the experience of trauma that sound may induce. 
Hence, we cannot ask the court to silence the perpetrator, but if we 
take acoustic justice seriously, we cannot not put these issues before 
judicial consideration. 
The atmosphere of the courtroom, in Andreas Phillippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ (2018) terms, is a location of justice in which the 
spatiality of the courtroom – its choreography and geography – is also 
one inhabited by sound. Parker and Ramshaw have both illuminated 
these environments and their impacts, but I would add that the shuffles, 
grunts, sighs, as well as the speech of the perpetrator, need to be part 
of the considerations of justice as they pertain to the victim/survivor’s 
experience. Without a consideration of the acoustics of justice then 
we are pretending that the experience of pain, of violence or indeed of 
trauma occurs in silence, knowing full well that it does not.
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Conclusion
Sound gets in. Sometimes involuntarily, sometimes without relief, 
always with effects. The body cannot not wrap around sound, to process, 
to understand, to signify, and, in psychoanalytic terms, to endeavour 
mastery. When this sound appears as voice it always gestures to the 
impossibility of mastery, the impossibility of knowing the world of 
others and indeed of oneself completely. Such a knowing, at any level, 
makes of voice a metonym for the experience of an identity without 
fixed contours, and it promotes a desire for these contours. Law can 
offer a substantiation of those contours, but at the same time it holds 
them out in promise, a promise which is broken with every permeation 
of the boundaries of flesh and feeling. We are not autonomous. Sound 
tells us so. 
When we experience sound, the effects can be pleasurable, but they 
can also be excruciating in their resonance with a loss of autonomy 
in experiences of interpersonal violence. Sound can permeate the 
boundaries of flesh when we do not want it to. So too can people. 
Law can speak to this permeation, when it is presented as a harm, 
but spaces of justice are replete with soundscapes that can reproduce 
the experience of a loss of autonomy through the very presence of the 
perpetrator; the sounds that emanate from his (and sometimes her/their) 
presence. Spaces of justice would struggle to contain these sounds, to 
make them unhearable or unfelt, but, if we are to take acoustic justice 
seriously, then the spaces of justice cannot not consider the permeating 
effects of such an atmosphere on survivors; they cannot not think on the 
soundscape that gets into the bodies of all, including the body of law. 
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1. This is a common term in diagnostic manuals and in complex discussions of 
the symptoms of trauma such as in Herman’s (2015) Trauma and Recovery: 
The Aftermath of Violence – From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror, Van der 
Kolk’s (2014) The Body Keeps the Score: Brian, Mind and Body in the Healing 
of Trauma and Luckhurst’s (2008) The Trauma Question. 
2. In Lacanian terms this is not a re-trauma so much as a new trauma as it is 
not only reflective of the experience of the assault but also a fragmentation 
of her identity as a person who would be believed, respected, protected 
by law. 
3. She is referring to Danielle Tyson’s 2012 book Sex, Culpability, and the 
Defence of Provocation. On speech acts of hatred, see Butler’s (1997) 
Excitable Speech Psychology. On orality and sexuality in law generally 
see Goodrich’s (1998) ‘The Laws of Love: Literature, History and the 
Governance of Kissing’ in New York University Review of Law and Social 
Change.  I note my appreciation to Young for illuminating this field for me.
4. The woman’s body and the man’s body have differing capacities for 
sovereignty in this sense. We know well, after many years of research and 
experience, that the autonomy over the body of ‘woman’ and the body of 
‘man’ are recognised legally and politically as very different relations, and 
the recognition of authority over these borders is offered disparately. That 
is, women are treated as porous and the boundaries of their bodies are not 
easily recognised as their own to police or indeed to define. Porous borders 
are not only the affliction of women, of course. They are the condition 
of all those who are brutally subject to the invasive regimes of others, 
including the state or to continue the sovereignty analogy, other states.
5. As we know well of Mill’s work ‘the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any members of a civilised community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (Mill 1974).
6. As well as saliva, semen, urine etc (see Lacan 2006: 693).  
7. For Lacan the subject exists always in a state of anticipated mastery from 
the point at which it encounters the reality of representation, or the reality 
that it is not all. He outlines this elaborately in the Ecrits in ‘The Mirror 
Stage as Formative of the I Function’ (2006: 75-81).
8. Arguably this is why voice has been pronounced as so crucial for an ethics 
of encounter in the form of an apology (Nicholas 1991). 
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9. See Caruth 1996, Laub 1992, Van der Kolk et al 1995, Van der Kolk 
2014, Herman 1992. 
10. For a comprehensive list of these see the American Psychiatric Association’s 
description of PTSD. For a more thorough articulation of these symptoms 
in relation to experiences see the 2015 edition of Herman’s Trauma and 
Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence- From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror. 
Or, as Caruth states: ‘In its most general definition trauma describes an 
overwhelming experience of sudden, or catastrophic events, in which 
the response to the event occurs in the often delayed, and uncontrolled 
repetitive occurrence of hallucinations and other intrusive phenomena’ 
(Caruth 1991: 181). 
11. As Crowe notes ‘Changes have been implemented in the justice system 
to minimize the emotionally violent impact on those testifying to sexual 
assault. Remote witness facilities may be used and measures are in 
place in the hope that the judge and criminal proceedings may be more 
sensitive to the individual testifying to sexual assault’ (Crowe 2019: 
407). Nevertheless, these measures are confined to the victim when s/
he testifies. To date I can find no documented precautions being taken 
to protect the victim from hearing the perpetrator’s testimony, or other 
aspects of their sonic presence, while she is in the courtroom.
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